In his latest book 'Rebels With a Cause: Famous dissenters and why they are not being heard', published by PenguinRandomHouse, IIM Professor T T Ram Mohan profiles well-known dissenters like Arundhati Roy, Oliver Stone, Kancha Ilaiah, David Irving, Yanis Varoufakis, U.G. Krishnamurti and John Pilger. Through their experiences, Ram Mohan illustrates how dissent tends to be severely circumscribed, and raises questions to challenge the way we view, and live in, the world.

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Excerpt:

How economist Yanis Varoufakis failed in his attempt to get Greece’s debt restructured during the Eurozone crisis

In the months that followed, Varoufakis engaged in hectic parleys with leaders in Europe and the IMF in an attempt to get the troika to move away from the MoU and accept the Greek government’s proposals on the debt crisis. He flew from one capital in Europe to another, pleading, cajoling, at times taunting his interlocutors.

Pictures of Varoufakis wearing a black leather jacket and riding his motorbike became famous. In Germany, a TV news anchor gushed that Varoufakis reminded her of the actor Bruce Willis.

One magazine gushed about Varoufakis’ ‘classical masculinity’. His tieless appearance and his preference for not tucking in his shirts and leaving their tops unbuttoned evoked comment and admiration. ‘What makes Yanis Varoufakis a sex icon’ was the headline in a German newspaper.

Varoufakis once showed up for an official meeting in Paris wearing a tight blue shirt and a leather overcoat. It created a splash in the media. Varoufakis suggests the sensationalism was misplaced. He had traveled without any change of clothes. Upon arrival in Paris, he had found that most shops were closed. The best he could do was to pick up two ‘vaguely suitable’ shirts and borrow a coat from Greece’s ambassador to France.16 To the world, it seemed that Varoufakis was trying to advertise his status as a maverick and outsider to the European establishment.

Varoufakis obtained support for his plans from American economists Jeffrey Sachs and Jamie Galbraith. He had the broad sympathy of former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers. He was able to reach across to and win over Norman Lamont, the conservative former Chancellor of the Exchequer of the UK, and France’s economics minister and future President, Emmanuel Macron.

The key negotiators within the eurozone, including German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble, would make appreciative noises about Varoufakis’ approach and even say a few positive things in public. In private, the head of the IMF in Europe went so far as to propose a write-off of €53 bn of debt—Varoufakis wondered whether he was dreaming.

When it came to the crunch, however, the officials of the eurozone were not willing to move away from the troika’s basic position: Greece must practise extreme austerity in order to repay the debt it had been saddled with. None of the arguments that Varoufakis could muster, none of his appeals for reasonableness changed this reality one bit.

Tsipras

Tsipras met Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel on 20 March. Merkel went over Greece’s proposals in great detail. Then, she came up with an idea. Since the Greeks detested Schauble and Varoufakis was seen by the Eurogroup as a problem, why not let the two ‘cancel’ each other? Merkel and Tsipras could then do a deal with each other.

Tsipras fell for the idea. A new group was created for carrying out negotiations. In the weeks to come, it was even insinuated—through inspired leaks—that Varoufakis and Schauble were plotting behind the backs of their leaders to get Greece out of the euro! Merkel had managed to drive a wedge between Tsipras and Varoufakis.

Varoufakis recounts an unsettling cabinet meeting on 3 April. Varoufakis had met Tsipras before the meeting and told him that, since there had been no progress in talks, it was time to announce that Greece would default on repayments to the IMF. Tsipras told him that the time had not yet come for a default. At the meeting, however, Tsipras changed his stance dramatically:

Greece is still a sovereign country and we, the cabinet, have the duty to say, ‘Enough!’ . . . Not only are we going to default but you

It was arranged that Varoufakis would meet Lagarde over the Easter holidays. Even as Varoufakis was leaving the airport in Washington, he saw a text message from Tsipras on his mobile asking him to call. When Varoufakis called, Tsipras told him, ‘Look, Yani, we’ve decided that we’re not going to default, not yet.’Yet another volte-face!

An astonished Varoufakis asked him what he should then say to the IMF chief. Tsipras told him that he should go ahead and threaten a default. The threat of a default would get Lagarde to call the ECB president and get him to relax the liquidity squeeze he had imposed on Greece.

Varoufakis duly conveyed the message to Lagarde. He received no assurance from the IMF chief that she would lean on the ECB to ease the liquidity situation in Greece. Lagarde suggested coolly that it was up to the ECB president to decide how to respond. On yet another trip to Washington, Varoufakis got conflicting signals from the US government.

President Barack Obama was friendly but offered nothing more than a homily about Greece compromising with the institutions and meeting them halfway. The US representative at the IMF was more helpful. He asked Varoufakis to prepare his own plan for the IMF instead of a modified version of the MoU.

This was followed by another meeting with the Eurogroup in Riga in Latvia on 24 April. Varoufakis was told bluntly that there was no alternative to implementing the MoU in full. No interim measures or compromises could be considered. The media kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism against Varoufakis. Bloomberg reported:

Euro area finance chiefs said Varoufakis’ handling of the talks was irresponsible and accused him of being a time-waster, a gambler and an amateur . . .

A Reuters report said:

While other ministers were feted by their entourages with food and warm clothing during the meeting in Riga, Varoufakis was seen alone at almost every turn, eschewing aides or any security detail. ‘He is completely isolated’, a senior Eurozone official told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

In the meantime, the German Chancellery leaked the news that Merkel had given Tsipras the cold shoulder. Sensing that Tsipras was not as committed to their position as he was earlier, Varoufakis offered to step down. Tsipras assured Varoufakis of his continued support:

Yani . . . They are aiming at your undoing to undo me. They want to get you to get at me. We are not going to let them, right? We are going to stand together. I do not want to hearagain about this nonsense . Stay strong. We have a war to win.

Barely two days later, at a cabinet meeting, Tsipras was singing a different tune. He said he was replacing Varoufakis’ deputy with Chouliarakis. He said he had to offer the Eurogroup something as they had demanded Varoufakis’ head. Those who spoke at the meeting supported Tsipras. Varoufakis’ isolation in the cabinet was complete.

Varoufakis met Tsipras later that day with his resignation letter in his pocket. As he waited for Tsipras, he noticed a few papers lying on his table. One number on one of the pages caught his attention. Tsipras was committing himself to a primary budget surplus of 3.5 per cent for the next ten years. Tsipras intended to junk Syriza’s position that the surplus could be 1.5 per cent at the most!

Tsipras offered the feeble defense that he was making the concession in the expectation that the troika would offer something in return. Incredibly, even at this point, Varoufakis could not bring himself to resign. He still clung to the hope that when Tsipras was confronted with the reality that the troika would not offer anything in return—when he faced complete ignominy—he

would be moved to defiance.

One episode that Varoufakis mentions stands out. He calls Jeffrey Sachs and tells him that his government is finally ready to default on its repayment on the IMF repayment. Half an hour later, Sachs calls him up. He says that five minutes after he hung up, he got a call from the US National Security Council asking whether Varoufakis had meant what he said. Varoufakis’

phone had been tapped and the spooks were making no bones about it!

This should have alerted Varoufakis to the possibility that the Americans and the Europeans knew full well what was going on within the Greek government. They would have known that Varoufakis had been isolated in his cabinet. They would have also known that the Greek government’s threats about Grexit were one big bluff.