(The opinions expressed here are those of the author, the

director of the Geoeconomics Program of the Center for the Study

of Democracy)

By Martin and Vladimirov

SOFIA, March 11 (Reuters) - The natural gas price shock

Europe is experiencing from the Iran war could accelerate the

region's decoupling from Russian energy, while the continent is

pushed further into the arms of the U.S.

The Iranian attack that forced QatarEnergy, the world's

second-largest liquefied natural gas exporter, to halt

production last week sent European benchmark gas prices

surging by nearly 50%. This underscored how exposed

the continent remains to geopolitical shocks beyond its borders

and the necessity of prioritizing energy security above all

else.

Qatar supplied only about 4% of European Union gas imports in

2025, according to the European Council, but with these volumes

now unavailable, the marginal gas molecule will increasingly

come from the U.S., the world's top gas producer and LNG

exporter.

This, in turn, could give the U.S. even more leverage to push

Europe to accelerate its full decoupling from Russian gas. That

is something Western leaders have sought to achieve through

sanctions since Moscow's invasion of Ukraine four years ago.

Any temporary easing of U.S. sanctions on Russian oil during

the war shouldn't alter this trajectory for gas. And Russian

President Vladimir Putin's threat last week to halt Russia's

remaining gas exports to Europe will provide further impetus for

reducing this dependency.

Russian gas still accounts for roughly 10% of EU imports. The EU

has mandated that all Russian gas imports must end by September

2027, but legal ambiguities and loopholes could prolong

dependence on Russian gas beyond 2028.

RUSSIA'S LINGERING GRIP ON EASTERN EUROPE

While the U.S. now supplies the majority of Europe's LNG,

Russia's state-controlled giant Gazprom remains the

dominant supplier of the super-chilled fuel in Central and

Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe. These regions are also

the destination for almost all of the Russian pipeline gas

flowing into Europe, with the remainder entering EU markets via

the TurkStream pipeline system linking Russia and Turkey.

Unlike Northern Europe, which has rapidly diversified its energy

operations in recent years through new LNG terminals and

pipeline interconnections, Central and Southern countries remain

structurally exposed. Limited storage, fragmented transmission

tariffs and poorly integrated markets have kept Russian pipeline

gas commercially more attractive.

This is why, at the Transatlantic Gas Security Summit held

in Washington in late February, just days before the conflict

began, the Americans had a clear message: accelerate the flow of

U.S. LNG into Europe's most vulnerable markets.

NEW ENERGY FRONTIER

To achieve this, senior U.S. officials and European energy

ministers are focused on a new flagship project: the Vertical

Gas Corridor linking Greek LNG terminals with Bulgaria, Romania,

Moldova and Ukraine.

The Vertical Gas Corridor could fundamentally reorient

Central and Southern European gas trade flows toward Atlantic

supply chains, locking in long-term LNG imports and making the

Balkans the next frontier market for exporters.

As part of this effort, major U.S. exporters including Cheniere

and Venture Global ( VG ) have agreed to supply around 8

billion cubic metres (bcm) per year under 20-year contracts with

traders and governments in Central and Eastern Europe. That is

equivalent to roughly 10% of U.S. LNG exports to the EU in 2025.

Those buyers have in turn signed non-binding import deals

with European intermediaries to support the flow of LNG through

these regions.

European leaders' willingness to lock themselves into long-term

gas contracts after spending over a decade speaking about the

need to reduce fossil fuel consumption highlights Europe's new

reality: energy security concerns outweigh decarbonisation

needs.

OBSTACLES TO A U.S. LNG SURGE

The success of the Vertical Gas Corridor is far from guaranteed.

Cross-border tariffs between Central and Southern European

countries remain prohibitively high. However, regional operators

are proposing a new "super-bundled" agreement that would allow

suppliers to reserve the entire corridor in a single contract.

Infrastructure bottlenecks also persist. LNG terminals lack

sufficient storage, meaning underground facilities in Bulgaria

and Ukraine would need to be expanded to enable large-scale

flows.

Additionally, without EU financial support to cover the extra

costs needed for transmission system operators to upgrade the

grid, Russian gas delivered via existing pipelines will remain

cheaper, undermining diversification efforts.

Finally, for the Vertical Gas Corridor to function at scale, LNG

must flow north from Turkey. The country hosts substantial

underutilised regasification capacity, totalling 58 bcm

annually, based on my calculations using data from Argus, enough

to increase U.S. LNG supply to Europe by an estimated 70%.

Around half of that capacity could potentially be used to ship

volumes along the Corridor to Ukraine and Central Europe.

In practice, however, Russian gas still occupies a significant

share of Turkish transit capacity through TurkStream. And in an

increasingly fractured geopolitical world, Turkey may be

unwilling to align with the interests of Europe and the U.S.,

especially if the financial incentives still make the

alternative more attractive.

The U.S. has framed its LNG exports as essential to Europe's

economic security, industrial growth, and even its emerging

infrastructure demand - and the conflict in Iran has shown that,

under current circumstances, that is probably correct.

Some may question whether deepening this dependence is

prudent, especially given America's decision to pursue the war

in Iran despite knowing the potential disruption it could cause

to the global energy system.

But Europe has few other options, and reducing Moscow's

influence over those EU economies most exposed to political and

economic pressure may be worth the risk.

(The views expressed here are those of Martin Vladimirov,

Director of the Geoeconomics Program of the Center for the Study

of Democracy (CSD))

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(Writing by Martin Vladimirov;

Editing by Marguerita Choy)